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Lessons We Can Learn
S we have all become painfully aware, inflation
is now the most serious problem facingmost nations
throughout the world. For those individuals who
have failed to correctly anticipate the course of
inflation, the resrdt has been capricious — and often
disheartening — wealth losses. Even for those who
have attempted to anticipate its corning, inflation
has produced significant changes in economic be-
havior: saving and investment have declined
substantially, productivity has fallen, and financial
markets have experienced increased instability and
uncertainty. The general result has been lower
standards of living fbr the citizens of this nation and
for much ofthe rest of the world.
Today I would like to discuss certain aspects of
the worldwide rise in inflation that has occurredover
the past decade and a half. In particular, I would
like to share some personal observations and impres-
sions that I gleaned during a recent visit to the
United Kingdom, Switzerland and West Germany.
These observations concern the different social and
political forces affecting the conduct of monetary
policy in different nations.
There are three basic propositions that I wish to
stress in my discussion:
First: that persistent inflation whenever it
occurs is a monetary phenomenon; it
results simply from excessive growth of
the money supply,
Second th it centr il banks ire the cit itors of
money md consequently in spite of
monetary control techniques th it differ
between n itions they ut c ipable of
reducing cx en elimin iting, infl mtion if
they so choose,
Third: that when central banks have chosen not
to contain the growth of money and in-
flation, this choice has usually resulted
from pressures exerted by, social and
political forces that do not especially
desire price stability.
The first two propositions are most easily demon-
strated by simply comparing the monetary expan-
sions and inflation experiences of West Germany,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United
States over the past 15 years.
As mature, developed and open economies, each
ofthese nations has been similarly affected by a host
of nonmonetarv factors, such as the vagaries of
weather, OPEC, and the general expansion of gov-
ernment activities. Yet, in spite ofthe commonality
of these influences on their respective economies,
there are discernibly it ncoinmon differences be-
tween the four nations in the manner in which they
have conducted monetary policy and in the associ-
ated inflation they have experienced.
During the early l960s, Switzerland had the high-
est rate of money growth (over 9 percent per year)
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and,consequently, the/iighestrate ofinflation(about
5 percent per year). At that time, the United States,
in contrast, had the lowest rate of money’ growth
(about 3 percent per year) and, again, not surprising-
ly, the lowest inflation rate (less than 2 percent per
year). Hates of money growth and inflation in the
United Kingdom and West Germany fell somewhere
between the United S~ite~’’and Switzerland. [See
table 1.]
What a dif’ference the past 15 years have made!
Since the mid-1960s, money growth in the United
Kingdom and the United States has steadily accel-
crated. Over the past five years, U.S. monetary
expansion was more than double what it was during
the early l960s. Money growth in the United King-
dom more than tripled its pre-1965 growth rate.
The patterns of Swiss and West German money
groxvth over the past 15 y’ears stand in sharp con-
trast to those of the United States andl the United
Kingdom. The Swiss rate of monetary increase has
declined sharply since the mid-1960s. West German
money growth has shown a mixed pattern — some-
times sharply decelerating, sometimes sharply
accelerating. However, over the past five years it
was less than its rate of growth in the early 1960s.
As a result of these divergent patterns, while in-
flation has averaged more than 13 percent per year in
the United Kingdom and over 7 percent per year in
the U.S. for the past five years, Germany has experi-
enced only a4 percent average annual inflation, and
inflation in Switzerland averaged a miniscule 2
percent per year.
Of course, over short periodis, nonmonetary
factors can also affect the rate of inflation. For exam-
pIe, as a result of OPEC, rates of inflation increased
dramatically in all four nations from 1973 to 1975.
After 1975, however, the fundamental relationship
between changes in the growth of money and
changes in the rate of inflation was reasserted. Infla-
tion declined in West Germany and Switzerland and
increased in the United Kingdom and the United
States, reflecting the dlifferent patterns of monetary
expansion in these countries.
This brief description of the interaction of money
growth and inflation demonstrates one point quite
clearly. Because West Germany and Switzerland
have maintained fairly tight control over the direc-
tion of growth of their money stocks, they have
achieved relatively low average rates of inflation.
This, unfortunately, was not the case in the United
Kingdom and the United States. The important
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I believe that the answer can be found in social
and politi al piessures thu ‘trise in response to
temporary economic ‘discomforts which affect
certain segments of the economy in time of inone-
tary restraint. These discomforts though painful
are sneces arypait of the process essential to wind
ing down inflation. They arise in the following way
Monetary restraint desi med to reduce inflition
usu’mllv pioduces ome initial, hut temporiry ad
verse impacts on employment and production
Iii ‘her unemployment and slow economic gio~th,
however temporary ines itably g nerit sentiment
to abandon policies of restraint.
For monetary iestr mint to pres ail, policy’n’i’mker
mu t b prepired topermit interest rates tofluctuate
freels in accord’mnce with market influences. Unan-
ticipated fluctuation in interest rates have ads erse
ffects on intere ‘t-rate-sensitive sectors of socety
such a the housing and financial industries. They
may al o pioduce movements in foreign exchange
rates which can haxe a disturbing effect on export
‘md importindustries. These groups can he expected
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to react td) their discomfort by’ exerting political
pressure upon monetary’ policymakers to retreat
from restraint.
Finally, stable monetary control subjects the
government to increased financial discipline. It
fbrces government to finance its expenditures
through higher taxes or through borrowing directly’
from time public’. Either way, the expenditures be-
come subject to greater public scrutiny’. And such
scrutiny and consequent discipline may’ not he
politically acceptable to those in government.
These social and political forces, arising as conse-
quences of monetary’ restraint, place enormous
pressure on monetary policymakers to abandon
attempts to control and’ reduce inflation. If’, through
the political process, temporary’economic protection
of certain sectors of society’ takes precedence os’er
price stability, the central hank, irrespective of its
independence, will find it increasingly difficult to
maintain strict monetary’ control.
How these social and political pressures influence
the conduct ofmonetary’ policy’ is dramatically’ i I Ins—
trated in the cases of the United Kingdom, Switzer-
land and Germany.
The United Kingdom, since World War I, has
facedi changes in worldwide economic andi p01itical
conditions that have rendered some of its economic
sectors inefficient. Instead of permitting these in-
dustries to decline and new ones to arise in their
place — a process that would have entailedi a tem-
porary’ decline in living standards during the transi-
tion — the political decision was macic to protect
the affected indIustries. Government expenditures
and government deficits grew; their costs bur-
geoned. Ultimately’, when all else failed, time govern-
ment itself entered directly into the business of
producing goods and services yia nationalization
of specific industries.
Concurrently’, ‘a constituency’ evolved whose
primary’ goal was to maintain high rates of employ-
ment at all times and to maintain the existing
standard of living despite declining demand and
productivity’. Over time this constituency gress’ in
political strength ‘and was able to force monetary’
policymakers to accelerate money growth. This ex-
pansion in money’ growth, amid the subsequent
higherinflation, dIkl not result from faulty technid1ue’s
or perverse intentions on the part of the Bank of
Engiand. It occurredi simply’ because the central
hank respondeci to ever—increasing pressures from
the public and private sectors that henefitedl from
an inflationary enviromnent.
In Switzerland, the central hank faces significant-
ly’ different kinds of political and social pressures.
For diecadles, Switzerland has been willing to toler-
ate the dccl inc of its major indlustries — agriculture
and watchmaking — ‘as changes occurred in worldl
economic conditions, For example, at the start of
the 1970s, Swiss watchmakers produced about 80
percent of all watches macic. Currently, they pro—
dluce only’about 30 percent andthis share iscontinu-
ing to decline, as watchmaking has shifted to the
Orient. The Swiss, inturn, pennittedl resources to be
reallocatedl into manufacturing and financial service
industries, and were willing to endure higher
unemployment in the process.
Why did) the Swiss place greater emphasis on price
stability’ than on employment stability’? First, much
of the Swiss labor force consists of so—called ‘‘guest
workers who are citizens of neighboring nations.
Since temporary rises in nnemploy’mnent fall more
heavily on “guest workers,” the political impact of
unemploy’ment on the Swiss electorate is lessened.
Furthermore, one ofthe most important Swiss indus-
tries — the providing offinancial services to the rest
ofthe world—owes its very’existence to the stability’
ofthe value of the Swiss franc. Because Swiss manu-
facturing relies almost solely’ on imported raw
materials, and to some extent, imported labor, short—
term fluctuations in exchange rates have little net
effect on Switzerland’s important export industries.
Finally, time Swiss government sector is relatively
small and is engaged in virtually’ no income main-
tenance endeavors.
Under these circumstances, it is easy to see that,
although there are a few sectors of the Swiss
economy’ that wouid benefit from protect ion from
the side effects of monetary’ restraint, the Swiss pro—
inflation constituency is relativeiy small. As a result,
the central hank is free to control monetary’ growth
irrespective of short-term fluctuations in interest
rates, exchange rates or unemployment rates.
West Germany lies somewhere hetween the
United Kingdom and Switzerland in terms of factors
impacting its condluctof monetary policy’. Although,
like Switzerland, it is a society’ that is dominated by
the private sector, it resembles the Unitedi Kingdiom
in that it has numerous income maintenance pro-
grams arid a large government sector. Also, like time
United Kingdom, Germany has industries that are
highly dependent on exports and,therefore, benefits
from a lower foreign—exchange value of its currency’.
There are also short—run pressures to maintain low
interest rates to favor various interest—sensitive
industries.
5FEDERAl.RESERVE BANK OFST. LOWS OCTOBER1981
On the other hand, there are importantfictors in
Germany which contribute to the viabilityof anti-
inflationary policies. The Bundesbank is legally
independent of the federal government; the preva-
lence of “guest workers” mitigates somewhat the
concern over higher unemployment, and Germany
hasnot yetbeenfaced with the problemofdeclining
industries. Most important of all, German citizens
remember, either first or second hand, the ravages
ofthehyperinfiation oftheearly 1920s.They arestill
willing to suffer some temporary economicdisloca-
tions to avoid a repetition ofthe tragedy of hyper-
inflation,
Thus, while there are growing demands in West
Germany for income redistribution and, therefore,
for incomemaintenancepolicies, the overwhelming
priorityis still topreventan acceleration in inflation.
As a result, the Bundesbank is free topursue mone-
taryrestraintandto disregardmostofthetransitional
problems that may occur as a result.
What lessons can we in the United States learn
from these comparisons?Can theybe appliedtoour
conduct ofmonetary policy?
First, the Swiss and West German experiences
make it clear that monetary policy can be used to
control and reduce the rate of inflation. The Swiss
andWestGerman experiences provide good exam-
ples of this.
More importantly, however, experience demon-
strates that monetary control is possible only ifthe
centralbank has aclear mandateto control inflation.
A political and social consensus thatprice stability
is the primary priority and responsibility of the
central bank must prevail.
Third, it is obvious that the larger the govern-
ment sector becomes relative to the private sector,
the greaterare the pm-inflation pressures on mone-
tary policymakers. This is notbecause governments
consciously desire inflation. Rather, it is because
inflation, especially ifit is unanticipated, makes it
easier for the government sector to expand its
control over national resources and provide politi-
cally desirable services. The United Kingdom and
the United States are good examples of this
phenomenon.
Perhapsthe biggestproblemthatmonetary policy-
makers face today in the United States is that the
constituencyforsectoralprotection, the pro-inflation
constituency, is growing. More and more groups,
through their elected representatives, have been
demanding protection from adverse market pres-
sures and Interest rate fluctuations. We protect the
unemployed, the elderly and the minorities. We
protect farmers, the housing industry, the auto-
mobile industry, the thrift industry and the bond
dealers. The list can and, unless we do something
about it, will go on and on.
Achievement ofprice level stability implies that
all sectors ofthe economy mustbe subjectto market
forces. It is the fear of these market forces that
produces powerhul political pressures forprotection
against inflation ratherthan elimination ofinflation.
Once this protection syndrome becomes embedded
in society, the return to price stability becomes
increasingly difficult
We inthe United States are presently at the cross-
roads. As ourinflation-protectedconstituenciescon-
tinue to grow, as they encompass an even greater
portion ofour society, there will be increased pres-
sures on the monetary authorities to abandon their
attempts to combat inflation. The events ofthe past
several weeks — the cries ofanguish that interest
rates must be forced down immediately and at any
cost — areareflection ofsuch political pressures in
action.
In a democratic society, even the titularly “inde-
pendent” central bankcannotremain immune from
political pressures. As Arthur Burns has noted, the
anguish of central banking arises not from its
inability to control money growth, but rather from
the difficulties that central bankers have in over-
coming the political pressures associated with
monetary restraint.
Ifwe pull back now from our current policy of
monetary restraint, we will,once again, have acted
to prolong and, perhaps, to institutionalize inflation
in this nation. We must now choose between long-
term benefits for all or short-tenn gains for a few.
What will our decision be?
6